Refugee Cessation After Galindo Camayo: A Practitioner’s Guide to Reavailment Under IRPA

Refugee cessation under paragraph 108(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act has become a critical area of refugee practice. The Federal Court of Appeal reshaped the analysis in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50. The Court did not weaken the statutory test for reavailment. Instead, it required an individualized inquiry into voluntariness, subjective intention, and actual reavailment. Later Federal Court decisions now show when that framework prevents cessation and when it still permits it.

Why refugee cessation demands careful analysis

Paragraph 108(1)(a) applies when a protected person voluntarily reavails themself of their country’s protection. The Minister bears the burden of proving cessation on a balance of probabilities. The analysis requires three elements: voluntariness, intention, and actual reavailment. These elements operate cumulatively. Therefore, the Minister must establish each one.

A protected person’s acquisition or use of a national passport can create important presumptions. Return travel to the country of nationality can strengthen those presumptions considerably. However, passport use does not erase the three-part test. The RPD must still determine whether the evidence establishes each legal element.

The consequences make the analysis particularly important. A final cessation finding under paragraphs 108(1)(a) to (d) can make a permanent resident inadmissible under subsection 40.1(2) of IRPA. Paragraph 46(1)(c.1) can also cause the person to lose permanent resident status. Subsection 108(3) deems the underlying refugee claim rejected after the RPD allows the cessation application.

These consequences also explain the elevated importance of adequate reasons. The RPD cannot treat a cessation application like an ordinary factual dispute. The decision can fundamentally change the person’s immigration status in Canada. Therefore, the reasons must meaningfully address the central evidence and legal issues.

The Galindo Camayo framework

In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50, Maria Camila Galindo Camayo received protection in Canada while she was young. She later travelled using Colombian passports, including several trips to Colombia. The Minister sought cessation under paragraph 108(1)(a). The RPD allowed the application.

The Federal Court set that decision aside. The Minister then appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. The FCA dismissed the appeal and provided detailed guidance for future cessation cases.

The FCA confirmed an important presumption involving national passports. When a refugee obtains and uses a passport from the country of nationality, that conduct may create a presumption of reavailment. The presumption becomes stronger when the person uses that passport to return to the country of nationality.

However, the Court emphasized that the presumption remains rebuttable. The RPD must examine the protected person’s individual circumstances. It must also consider the person’s evidence about actual knowledge and subjective intention.

What the person actually knew matters

One of the most important aspects of Galindo Camayo concerns knowledge. The RPD had relied partly on what Ms. Galindo Camayo should have known. The FCA rejected that approach.

The decision-maker must ask what the person actually knew. It must also determine whether the person actually intended to depend on the protection of the country of nationality. Education, sophistication, and experience may remain relevant. However, those characteristics cannot replace an inquiry into actual knowledge.

Importantly, ignorance does not automatically defeat a cessation application. A lack of knowledge remains one factor within the larger analysis. Other evidence may still establish intention. Nevertheless, the RPD cannot simply impute knowledge because the person appears educated or sophisticated.

For practitioners, this distinction is essential. The evidence should show what the client understood at each important point. That inquiry may include legal advice, CBSA warnings, previous travel, discussions with immigration officials, and the client’s own understanding.

The RPD must keep the three elements separate

The FCA also warned against collapsing the three legal elements into one conclusion. The RPD had relied heavily on passport use under voluntariness, intention, and actual reavailment. That approach left little room for meaningful rebuttal.

Evidence can certainly overlap between the three elements. However, the legal inferences remain different. The RPD must identify why specific evidence establishes voluntariness. It must separately explain why the evidence establishes subjective intention. Finally, it must determine whether the person actually obtained the protection of the country of nationality.

This analytical separation has become one of the most important features of post-Galindo Camayo jurisprudence.

The paragraph 84 factors

Paragraph 84 of Galindo Camayo provides practitioners with an important roadmap. The FCA identified several matters that may affect the assessment of reavailment. These include the person’s age, education, sophistication, and actual knowledge. The RPD should also consider the identity of the agent of persecution. In addition, the decision-maker should examine the circumstances surrounding passport acquisition and use.

Travel itself requires close attention. The RPD may consider the purpose, frequency, duration, and destination of travel. It may also consider what the person did while abroad. Precautions against persecution can also become significant. The RPD should consider whether the person continued to experience subjective fear. It should also assess any other evidence capable of rebutting the presumptions. No single factor necessarily determines the outcome.

Practitioners should not treat paragraph 84 as a mathematical checklist. The number of favourable factors does not decide the case. The RPD must assess the evidence cumulatively and contextually.

Kaya: when the presumptions survive

Kaya v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 123 demonstrates that Galindo Camayo does not create a safe harbour against cessation.

Mr. Kaya obtained Turkish passports and returned to Türkiye twice. During his first trip, he married and obtained a Turkish national identity card. He also dealt with Turkish authorities concerning his military service exemption. The RPD found that these actions supported intention and actual reavailment. It also identified credibility concerns regarding his explanations for the travel.

The second trip caused further problems. Mr. Kaya travelled again while the Minister’s cessation application remained pending. He used his Turkish identity card to enter Türkiye. He testified that he wanted to avoid a Turkish passport stamp because it could affect the cessation proceedings. Justice Favel upheld the RPD’s decision. The Court concluded that the applicant essentially asked the Court to reweigh the evidence. Judicial review does not permit that approach.

Kaya therefore provides an important lesson. Galindo Camayo requires the RPD to consider subjective intention. However, the RPD does not have to accept the protected person’s explanation. Objective conduct, credibility concerns, state contact, and repeated travel may undermine that evidence.

Yao: strong evidence cannot replace the intention analysis

Yao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 920 provides an important counterpoint.

Mr. Yao renewed his Chinese passport and travelled to China several times. He also engaged in sightseeing and attended social activities. Moreover, he acknowledged that returning to China could jeopardize his Canadian status.

Despite those facts, Justice Favel set the cessation decision aside.

The problem concerned the RPD’s analysis of intention. The RPD relied on substantially the same facts under all three elements. It cited passport renewal, travel, social activities, and presentation to Chinese authorities.

However, the RPD did not meaningfully examine why Mr. Yao obtained his passport. He testified that he wanted to visit the United States. He also testified that Canadian officials told him he needed a passport for that travel.

The Court held that the RPD had to consider whether that explanation could rebut the presumption of intention. The decision-maker could reject the explanation. However, it first had to analyze it.

This distinction lies at the heart of Yao. Strong objective evidence does not allow the RPD to skip the subjective intention inquiry.

Three different questions about knowledge

Yao also helps practitioners separate three different concepts.

First, did the person know that travel could jeopardize Canadian immigration status? Second, did the person understand that passport use involved the issuing country’s diplomatic protection? Third, did the person actually intend to depend on that country’s protection?

These questions may overlap. However, they do not mean the same thing.

A person might know that returning home could cause immigration problems in Canada. That knowledge does not automatically establish an intention to seek national protection. Conversely, repeated travel after clear warnings can substantially weaken an assertion of innocent misunderstanding.

Practitioners should therefore resist overly simple formulations. The issue does not end with the question, “Did the client know cessation was possible?” The more precise question concerns what the client understood about the legal and practical significance of the conduct.

Onay: what a Camayo-compliant decision looks like

Onay v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1596 shows how a cessation decision can survive judicial review after Galindo Camayo.

Mr. Onay renewed his Turkish passport twice. He also travelled repeatedly to Türkiye and Iran. The Turkish state itself had played a central role in the persecution underlying his refugee claim.

The chronology of warnings became particularly important. Canadian immigration officials warned him after his 2017 return. The GCMS notes recorded that officials explained the potential cessation consequences.

Officials warned him again after his 2019 travel. The second GCMS entry recorded that he confirmed his understanding. Nevertheless, he later travelled through and into Türkiye again.

Mr. Onay argued that limited English affected his understanding. However, he provided no evidence establishing that he misunderstood the warnings. He also did not establish that the GCMS notes were unreliable.

The RPD considered his limited education and relative lack of sophistication. It also considered the short duration of some trips, the reasons for travel, his precautions, and his dealings with Turkish authorities.

After considering those factors, the RPD found that he had not rebutted the relevant presumptions. Justice Duchesne upheld the decision.

Why Onay matters for judicial review

Onay provides an important lesson concerning the role of the Federal Court. A judicial review does not give the applicant another opportunity to rebalance the evidence. The Court reviews the reasonableness of the RPD’s reasoning.

Where the RPD considers the material evidence and explains its conclusion, the Court may defer. Another decision-maker might have reached a different result. That possibility alone does not make the decision unreasonable.

This point distinguishes Onay from Yao. In Yao, the RPD failed to perform the necessary intention analysis. In Onay, the RPD performed that analysis and explained why the evidence failed to rebut the presumptions.

Practitioners should therefore identify analytical defects rather than simply challenge the weight assigned to evidence.

Warnings can change the evidentiary landscape

Onay also highlights the importance of chronology. A protected person may initially travel without understanding the consequences. That explanation may carry weight under Galindo Camayo.

However, later conduct may change the analysis. A clear warning from CBSA or IRCC can become powerful evidence concerning actual knowledge. Continued travel after such a warning may make rebuttal considerably more difficult.

The warning itself does not automatically prove intention. The RPD must still consider the entire record. However, the warning may remove one important basis for challenging the presumption.

Counsel should therefore create a knowledge chronology alongside the travel chronology. Each warning should include the date, source, language, context, and evidence of comprehension.

The original agent of persecution matters

Galindo Camayo also emphasizes the identity of the agent of persecution. This distinction can materially change the meaning of passport use.

Where the state itself caused the persecution, renewed dealings with that state may carry significant evidentiary weight. Applying for a passport may expose the person to the same authorities they claimed to fear. Entering the country can create additional direct contact.

The analysis may differ where a non-state actor caused the persecution. A national passport may not connect the protected person to the persecutor in the same manner. The person may still distrust the state’s ability to provide effective protection.

Therefore, practitioners should obtain the original refugee decision whenever possible. The Basis of Claim form alone may not answer the question. The RPD’s original reasons may identify precisely which agent or agents formed the basis for protection.

Onay demonstrates this point clearly. Mr. Onay later raised fears involving Turkish nationalists. However, the original refugee decision identified the Turkish state as the agent of persecution. The Federal Court found that distinction important.

Precautions need concrete evidence

Precautions taken during return travel can support continued subjective fear. Galindo Camayo itself demonstrates this point through the applicant’s use of private security in Colombia.

However, generic statements carry less weight. Simply saying that a person “kept a low profile” may not establish much. Counsel should identify what the person actually did.

Relevant precautions may include avoiding government offices, limiting travel, staying at an undisclosed location, using private transportation, or avoiding known persecutors. Other precautions may include private security or restricted public activity.

The evidence should also explain why the particular precaution mattered. The connection between the precaution and the feared agent gives the evidence its probative value.

Family emergencies do not automatically make travel involuntary

Family circumstances frequently appear in refugee cessation cases. An ill parent, funeral, marriage, or family reunification can create powerful personal reasons for travel.

However, a compelling reason does not automatically make travel involuntary. Kaya and Onay both illustrate this point.

In Onay, the applicant travelled for approximately three months to care for his ill mother. He had siblings in Türkiye who could also provide care. He acknowledged that hired assistance remained possible.

The RPD could therefore characterize his choice as voluntary. The Federal Court upheld that conclusion.

Practitioners should distinguish emotional or moral necessity from legal involuntariness. A person may feel compelled by family responsibility while still making a voluntary decision to travel.

Travel purpose still matters

Although compelling circumstances do not create a separate defence, the purpose of travel remains relevant. Paragraph 84 of Galindo Camayo expressly identifies travel purpose as a factor.

The reason for travel can help explain the person’s intention. Someone who enters a country briefly because of a family emergency presents a different factual context from someone who repeatedly returns for vacations.

However, the reason itself does not determine intention. The RPD must examine the reason together with all surrounding conduct.

Practitioners should therefore avoid an argument that says, “The trip was justified, so cessation cannot apply.” A stronger submission connects the travel purpose to the person’s actual intention and conduct.

Actual reavailment requires separate attention

Practitioners sometimes concentrate so heavily on intention that they give actual reavailment insufficient attention. The third element requires its own analysis.

Kaya provides useful examples. Mr. Kaya obtained Turkish passports, a national identity card, and marriage registration. He also dealt with Turkish authorities. Those interactions supported the RPD’s finding of actual reavailment.

Onay adds another important dimension. Mr. Onay repeatedly entered and exited Türkiye using his Turkish passport. Turkish authorities also conducted a document check during one visit.

In addition, he used his Turkish passport to travel to Iran. The RPD found that he benefited from arrangements between Türkiye and Iran. The Federal Court upheld the conclusion that this conduct reflected reliance on Türkiye’s diplomatic protection.

Therefore, third-country travel can matter. A protected person does not necessarily need to return home before passport use becomes relevant to reavailment.

Third-country travel deserves close review

National passports provide more than permission to enter the country of nationality. They also permit international travel through arrangements negotiated by the issuing state.

This feature may support an argument about diplomatic protection. However, the strength of that inference depends on the circumstances.

Travel to the country of nationality generally produces a stronger presumption. The person then enters territory controlled by the very state whose protection becomes relevant. Third-country travel does not usually carry the same factual weight.

Nevertheless, counsel should examine every use of the national passport. A cessation analysis should not focus exclusively on home-country travel.

Country-condition evidence still has a role

Cessation does not require the RPD to conduct a new forward-looking section 96 or section 97 risk assessment. Kaya confirms that principle.

However, Yao shows that evidence concerning state protection can still matter. Evidence that authorities continue to target people with the applicant’s profile may affect the actual reavailment analysis.

The distinction is important. Counsel should not simply argue that the home country remains dangerous. Instead, counsel should connect country evidence to the statutory question.

For example, evidence may show that the authorities could not realistically provide the protection supposedly obtained. That evidence may also support precautions or continuing subjective fear.

Credibility can determine the outcome

Subjective intention does not mean that the protected person controls the result by describing their own state of mind. The RPD can test that evidence against documents, conduct, and internal consistency.

Kaya illustrates this problem clearly. The RPD identified discrepancies concerning his father’s health, his travel reasons, where he stayed, and his activities in Türkiye.

His conduct during active cessation proceedings created another significant problem. He returned to Türkiye despite knowing that the Minister had already initiated proceedings.

Therefore, practitioners should corroborate subjective intention whenever possible. Contemporary messages, medical records, travel plans, security arrangements, and legal advice may support the explanation.

Attempts to conceal travel from Canadian authorities can create serious credibility problems. Counsel should identify those issues before the hearing and address them directly.

A practical framework for refugee cessation files

Practitioners should begin with the original refugee record. They should obtain the RPD reasons, Basis of Claim form, and important supporting evidence. The original reasons may identify the accepted agent of persecution and the precise basis for protection.

Next, counsel should build a passport chronology. The chronology should identify when each passport was obtained or renewed. It should explain why the person sought the document and what they understood at the time.

Counsel should then prepare a separate travel chronology. Each trip should include its purpose, duration, destination, urgency, alternatives, accommodation, activities, and government contact.

A knowledge chronology should follow. Counsel should identify every warning, legal consultation, CBSA interaction, and relevant GCMS entry. The chronology should show what the client actually understood before each subsequent act.

Finally, counsel should analyze the three statutory elements separately. The submissions should address voluntariness, subjective intention, and actual reavailment under distinct headings.

Questions practitioners should ask

When reviewing a potential cessation matter, counsel should ask why the client obtained the national passport. That question may become critical after Yao.

Counsel should also ask whether the client explored a refugee travel document. The answer may explain the decision to obtain the national passport. It may also reveal what advice the client received.

Every home-country trip requires separate examination. Counsel should determine why the person travelled, whether alternatives existed, and how long the person remained there.

Practitioners should also examine the client’s dealings with government authorities. Passport renewal, national identification, marriage registration, property transactions, police contact, and border interactions may all matter.

Finally, counsel must determine what the client knew at each stage. A warning received after the first trip cannot explain the client’s knowledge before that trip. Chronology therefore matters enormously.

Judicial review after Galindo Camayo

The post-Galindo Camayo cases also show how counsel should approach judicial review.

A weak argument says that the RPD gave too much weight to the passport or travel. That argument may simply invite the Court to characterize the case as a request to reweigh evidence.

A stronger argument identifies a flaw in the reasoning structure. Yao provides the clearest example. The RPD relied on the same facts across all three stages without meaningfully examining subjective intention.

Counsel may also identify a failure to consider actual knowledge. Another possible issue involves the RPD’s failure to address relevant precautions or the proper agent of persecution.

The argument should connect the omitted issue to the statutory test. The Court does not require perfect reasons. However, Galindo Camayo requires meaningful engagement with central evidence.

Galindo Camayo, Kaya, Yao, and Onay together

The four cases now provide a coherent framework for practitioners.

Galindo Camayo establishes the governing architecture. Passport use and return travel create important presumptions, but the RPD must conduct an individualized assessment.

Kaya shows that credibility problems and extensive dealings with state authorities can leave those presumptions unrebutted. Subjective intention does not require the RPD to accept the person’s explanation.

Yao shows that strong objective evidence cannot replace a separate intention analysis. Even knowledge of possible Canadian immigration consequences does not automatically prove an intention to seek national protection.

Onay shows what happens when the RPD properly applies the framework. If the RPD considers the relevant evidence and explains its reasoning, the Federal Court will not normally rebalance the case.

The practitioner’s takeaway

The central lesson does not concern passport use alone. The most important issue concerns the meaning of the protected person’s conduct within the complete factual context.

Practitioners should focus on chronology. They should identify when the client obtained the passport, what the client knew, when the client travelled, and when authorities issued warnings.

They should also focus on the original agent of persecution. State persecution can give later dealings with national authorities greater significance.

Finally, practitioners should keep the three legal elements separate. Voluntariness does not establish intention. Intention does not automatically establish actual reavailment.

Galindo Camayo changed the required quality of the analysis. It did not create immunity from cessation. Kaya, Yao, and Onay now show how that analysis operates in practice.

For counsel, the strongest case will usually depend on evidence rather than labels. A detailed chronology, careful credibility assessment, and disciplined three-part analysis can become decisive.

Resources

• Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50
• Kaya v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 123
• Yao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 920
• Onay v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1596
• Hamid v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1541
• Saha v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1553
• Levi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 64
• IRPA, section 108
• IRPA, section 40.1
• IRPA, section 46
• IRB, Chapter 12: Applications to Cease Refugee Protection
• UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status

Disclaimer

This article provides general legal information for immigration and refugee practitioners. It does not provide legal advice for any particular cessation proceeding. Refugee cessation cases depend heavily on their facts, evidence, procedural history, and original basis for protection. Practitioners should review the current legislation, jurisprudence, and complete record before advising a protected person.